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Sample data. Every entry on this page is illustrative.

A ledger of what was tested, and what it proved.

Bravos records each test of a security claim as an entry: the GuardLink annotation that made the claim, the CXG test that ran, the verdict, the evidence, and the commit it ran against.

Below is that ledger for acme-shop, the fictional shop from our homepage story, where Maya and Alex chase an avatar upload that turns into stored XSS.

Three outcomes

Confirmed
The test reproduced the exploit against the running app. The risk is real at that commit.
Refuted
The test reached the app and the exploit did not work. That rules out one way in, not the threat itself, so it can be tested again from another angle.
Mitigated
A security control was seen rejecting the exploit. Stronger than refuted: the defence was observed working, not just the attack failing.
This is sample data.These entries were written to show the format. They are not real findings, customers or results, and the project, people, commits and runs are fictional.

Sample ledger entries

Showing 9 of 9 sample entries

Sample ledger, not real findings. acme-shop is a fictional project from our homepage story. Times are UTC on 23 September 2026.
EntryTimeOutcomeClaim testedCXG testSourceEvidence
Round 1 tested against ff09f3f, the annotated revision of main
L-001RefutedA crafted file name writes outside the uploads folder#path-traversal on #avatar-apihigh severity, CWE-22acme-avatar-path-traversalff09f3fsample run acme-shop-r1

Verdict

Refuted. path.basename() strips the directory part, so the file stays inside uploads/.

GuardLink annotation

// @exposes #avatar-api to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- "x-filename reaches path.join(UPLOAD_DIR, name)"
// @comment -- "path.basename() stops directory traversal in x-filename; it does not restrict the file type, so #unrestricted-upload stays open"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-path-traversal. POST /api/avatar with x-filename: ../../server.ts, then list where the file landed.

Evidence

$ curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4100/api/avatar -H "x-filename: ../../server.ts" --data-binary "marker"
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
{"url":"/uploads/server.ts"}

$ ls uploads/   # where the file landed
server.ts

From sample run acme-shop-r1 at commit ff09f3f. Sample transcript.

L-002ConfirmedAny file type is accepted as an avatar#unrestricted-upload on #avatar-apihigh severity, CWE-434acme-avatar-html-uploadff09f3fsample run acme-shop-r1

Verdict

Confirmed. The server stored an HTML file as an avatar.

GuardLink annotation

// @exposes #avatar-api to #unrestricted-upload [high] cwe:CWE-434 -- "handleAvatarUpload() passes req.headers['x-filename'] to writeFile() with no signature check on the body"
// @confirmed #unrestricted-upload on #avatar-api [high] cwe:CWE-434 -- "Local lab at ff09f3f: POST /api/avatar with x-filename: marker-r1.html and an inert HTML body returned 201 and stored /uploads/marker-r1.html"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-html-upload. POST an inert HTML marker named marker-r1.html to /api/avatar.

Evidence

$ curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4100/api/avatar -H "x-filename: marker-r1.html" --data-binary "<p>acme-shop verification marker</p>"
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
content-type: application/json

{"url":"/uploads/marker-r1.html"}

From sample run acme-shop-r1 at commit ff09f3f. Sample transcript.

L-003ConfirmedAn uploaded HTML file renders in the shop's own origin#stored-xss on #avatar-apihigh severity, CWE-79acme-avatar-html-uploadff09f3fsample run acme-shop-r1

Verdict

Confirmed. The marker came back as text/html from the shop domain.

GuardLink annotation

// @exposes #avatar-api to #stored-xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- "serveUpload() maps TYPES['.html'] to text/html, so an uploaded .html file renders in the shop origin"
// @confirmed #stored-xss on #avatar-api [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- "Local lab at ff09f3f: GET /uploads/marker-r1.html returned 200 with content-type: text/html and the marker body"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-html-upload. GET /uploads/marker-r1.html and check the status, the content type and the marker body.

Evidence

$ curl -si http://127.0.0.1:4100/uploads/marker-r1.html
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
cache-control: public, max-age=3600
content-type: text/html

<p>acme-shop verification marker</p>

From sample run acme-shop-r1 at commit ff09f3f. Sample transcript.

L-004RefutedAn uploaded SVG runs script when it is viewed#svg-script on #avatar-apimedium severity, CWE-79acme-avatar-svg-uploadff09f3fsample run acme-shop-r1

Verdict

Refuted. The SVG is served as application/octet-stream, so it never renders.

GuardLink annotation

// @exposes #avatar-api to #svg-script [medium] cwe:CWE-79 -- "An .svg avatar could carry script if it is served as image/svg+xml"
// @comment -- "TYPES has no .svg entry, so serveUpload() falls back to application/octet-stream and the browser downloads the file"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-svg-upload. POST an inert SVG marker, then GET it and read the content type.

Evidence

$ curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4100/api/avatar -H "x-filename: marker.svg" --data-binary @marker.svg
HTTP/1.1 201 Created

$ curl -si http://127.0.0.1:4100/uploads/marker.svg
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: application/octet-stream

From sample run acme-shop-r1 at commit ff09f3f. Sample transcript.

L-005ConfirmedOne user's upload replaces another user's avatar#avatar-overwrite on #avatar-apimedium severity, CWE-73acme-avatar-name-collisionff09f3fsample run acme-shop-r1

Verdict

Confirmed. The second upload overwrote the first file.

GuardLink annotation

// @exposes #avatar-api to #avatar-overwrite [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- "The stored name comes from the client, so two uploads named avatar.png share one file"
// @confirmed #avatar-overwrite on #avatar-api [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- "Sample lab at ff09f3f: a second session's avatar.png replaced the first session's file"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-name-collision. Upload avatar.png as two test sessions, then fetch it and compare bytes.

Evidence

$ curl -s -X POST …/api/avatar -H "x-filename: avatar.png" --data-binary @session-a.png   # session A
{"url":"/uploads/avatar.png"}
$ curl -s -X POST …/api/avatar -H "x-filename: avatar.png" --data-binary @session-b.png   # session B
{"url":"/uploads/avatar.png"}
$ curl -s …/uploads/avatar.png | sha256sum
matches session-b.png

From sample run acme-shop-r1 at commit ff09f3f. Sample transcript.

Re-test replayed against e656a86, the fix on fix/avatar-validation
L-006MitigatedAny file type is accepted as an avatar#unrestricted-upload on #avatar-apihigh severity, CWE-434acme-avatar-html-uploade656a86sample replay acme-shop-r2

Verdict

Mitigated. The HTML upload is rejected with 415; a real PNG still uploads.

GuardLink annotation

// @mitigates #avatar-api against #unrestricted-upload using #type-allowlist -- "handleAvatarUpload() accepts only bodies whose leading bytes match SIGNATURES; x-filename is ignored"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-html-upload. Same test as L-002, replayed against the fix, plus a PNG as a control.

Evidence

$ curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4100/api/avatar -H "x-filename: marker-r2.html" --data-binary "<p>acme-shop verification marker</p>"
HTTP/1.1 415 Unsupported Media Type
{"error":"Avatar must be a PNG or JPEG under 2 MB"}

$ curl -si -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4100/api/avatar --data-binary @tiny.png   # control
HTTP/1.1 201 Created

From sample replay acme-shop-r2 at commit e656a86. Sample transcript.

L-007RefutedAn uploaded HTML file renders in the shop's own origin#stored-xss on #avatar-apihigh severity, CWE-79acme-avatar-html-uploade656a86sample replay acme-shop-r2

Verdict

Refuted. The file stored before the fix now returns 404.

GuardLink annotation

// @mitigates #avatar-api against #stored-xss using #type-allowlist -- "serveUpload() only serves image/png or image/jpeg, with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-html-upload. Same test as L-003: fetch the file stored in round 1.

Evidence

$ curl -si http://127.0.0.1:4100/uploads/marker-r1.html   # stored by round 1
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

From sample replay acme-shop-r2 at commit e656a86. Sample transcript.

L-008MitigatedOne user's upload replaces another user's avatar#avatar-overwrite on #avatar-apimedium severity, CWE-73acme-avatar-name-collisione656a86sample replay acme-shop-r2

Verdict

Mitigated. Each session got its own file name; neither upload replaced the other.

GuardLink annotation

// @mitigates #avatar-api against #avatar-overwrite using #filename-norm -- "Each upload gets its own server-generated name"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-name-collision. Same test as L-005, replayed against the fix.

Evidence

$ curl -s -X POST …/api/avatar --data-binary @session-a.png   # session A
{"url":"/uploads/0b7e…-a1.png"}
$ curl -s -X POST …/api/avatar --data-binary @session-b.png   # session B
{"url":"/uploads/5c2d…-f4.png"}

From sample replay acme-shop-r2 at commit e656a86. Sample transcript.

L-009RefutedA very large upload is buffered whole and slows the server#resource-exhaustion on #avatar-apimedium severity, CWE-400acme-avatar-oversizee656a86sample replay acme-shop-r2

Verdict

Refuted. The upload stops at 2 MB and is rejected with 415.

GuardLink annotation

// @exposes #avatar-api to #resource-exhaustion [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- "The fix reads the body before checking its signature"
// @comment -- "readBody() stops at MAX_BYTES and returns null, so an oversized body is never buffered whole"

In src/api/avatar.ts

CXG test

acme-avatar-oversize. POST a 3 MB body and check the response and the server's memory.

Evidence

$ head -c 3145728 /dev/zero | curl -si -X POST …/api/avatar --data-binary @-
HTTP/1.1 415 Unsupported Media Type
{"error":"Avatar must be a PNG or JPEG under 2 MB"}

From sample replay acme-shop-r2 at commit e656a86. Sample transcript.

After the re-test at e656a86, this sample has no open exposures on #avatar-api. The next change starts a new round.

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